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Treaty of Union: 
Voting Patterns and Political Influence 
Allan I. Macinnes* 
T h e m a k i n g of t he Treaty of U n i o n , which created the Un i t ed Kingdom 
of G r e a t Bri tain from 1 May 1707, r e m a i n s an issue of polit ical contro-
versy (Smout 1963; Ferguson 1977; Riley 1978). 
T h a t an inco rpo ra t ing pa r l i amen ta ry un ion , which had been on the po-
litical agenda since 1702, was actually accompl i shed over five m o n t h s in 
t he last crucial session of the Scottish estates from 6 October 1706, can be 
a t t r ibu ted to var ious inf luences . D ip lomat i c b r i n k m a n s h i p , mi l i ta ry inti-
m i d a t i o n and polit ical m a n i p u l a t i o n on the par t of the Engl ish min is t ry of 
Q u e e n A n n e were c o m p o u n d e d by economic defea t i sm, f inancial chica-
nery and , above all, political inep t i tude on the par t of the Scottish estates. 
T h e conc lud ing s t a t ement of the queen ' s commiss ione r , J a m e s Douglas , 
second duke of Queensbe r ry , on 25 March 1707 tha t the Treaty would 
p r o v e a v is ionary act of s t a t e smansh ip (Thomson 1824. p. 491) should not 
obscure the view of h i s to r ians - as dist inct from pol i t ic ians - that its ma-
king was p r imar i ly a self-inflicted act of political lacerat ion which sacri-
ficed na t iona l i n d e p e n d e n c e for mater ia l a d v a n c e m e n t . 
A 50-field da tabase has been cons t ruc ted pr incipal ly from p r imary sour-
ces to m e a s u r e how, not analyse why, the Scottish estates voted themse lves 
out of polit ical exis tence (1). A separate record has been created for each of 
t he 230 m e m b e r s cited in the pa r l i amen ta ry rolls (2). T h e da tabase seeks to 
p rov ide a c o m p r e h e n s i v e p ic ture of political b e h a v i o u r based on recorded 
vot ing divis ions in the last pa r l i amen ta ry session of the Scottish estates 
r a the r than rely on vot ing samples which a rguably m o v e analysis away 
from historical pa t t e rns in to t he r ea lms of m a t h e m a t i c a l probabi l i ty . 
As well as fields separately i temiz ing the n a m e , t he cons t i tuency and 
any r e m a r k a b l e features inf luencing vot ing for each m e m b e r of the Scot-
tish estates, coding has been resorted to for estate m e m b e r s h i p , parlia-
m e n t a r y status, na t iona l par ty affiliation a n d the regional location of con-
s t i tuencies . T h e lat ter field has proved notably useful in identifying terri-
torial inf luences in a un i camera l pa r l i ament for wh ich the f ranchise of 
c o m m i s s i o n e r s from the shires and bu rghs as of nob le s was inheren t ly 
feudal . 
* Address all communications to Allan I. Macinnes, Glasgow University, Scottish 
History Dept., 9 University Gardens, Glasgow G12 8QH, Great Britain. 
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Because t h e U n i o n was car r ied in the teeth of publ ic opposi t ion , the 
receipt of pe t i t ions from 15 out of the 33 shires and 21 out of the 67 royal 
b u r g h s is denoted no t only by a separa te field but also by the insert ion of a 
coded symbol wi th in the field cover ing the next recorded vot ing division. 
W h i l e at least one b u r g h commiss ione r was m a n d a t e d to vote in favour 
of U n i o n (Smout 1987, pp . 184-84), no pet i t ions , as t he Opposi t ion pointed-
ly c o m m e n t e d , were fo r thcoming from the const i tuencies in its favour 
( T h o m s o n 1824, p p . 386-87). Bla tant disregard for t he wishes of the i r con-
s t i tuen ts is t h e riiost ident i f iable response of sh i re and b u r g h commiss io -
n e r s . Whi l e pe t i t ions served to shore up the resolve of the Oppos i t ion , no 
m e m b e r percept ively changed his vot ing pa t te rn on receipt of a pet i t ion 
f rom his cons t i tuen ts . 
A n o t h e r symbol has been inser ted in to the re levant vot ing field to de-
n o t e t he t im ing of protes ts . Separa te fields i temize the n u m b e r of and the 
cod ing for protes ts against specific art icles, a m e n d m e n t s or p rocedures . 
Pro tes t s m o u n t e d overwhe lming ly , but not exclusively, by t he Opposi t ion 
in the i r efforts to negate , a l ter and delay the passage of U n i o n , serve as 
useful indica tors for par ty activists . Only 80 m e m b e r s , 35% of t he estates, 
failed to par t ic ipa te in pro tes t ing ; albeit 78 m e m b e r s - 34% - protested on 
on ly one occasion, the vast major i ty - 64 m e m b e r s - in a counter -protes t at 
t h e b lock ing tactics of t h e Oppos i t ion . 
Separa te fields have also been created to i temize the holding and spoils 
of office, pr inc ipa l ly to m e m b e r s of the Cour t and Squadrone Volante, the 
pa r t i e s suppor t ing an incorpora t ing U n i o n , whose p r e d o m i n a n c e on the 
commiss ion negot ia t ing U n i o n was car r ied over in to the pa r l i amen ta ry 
c o m m i t t e e charged to redraft or a m e n d art icles referred from the floor of 
t h e house . T h e mon ies advanced covertly by the English t reasury, reputed-
ly to meet a r rea rs of salary, a re i temized with respect to individual c la ims 
a n d actual paymen t s . T h e £ 20,000 (£ 240,000 Scots) so advanced pr ior to 
t he open ing of t he pa r l i amen ta ry session was seemingly used less to per-
suade m e m b e r s not to vote for Un ion as to shore up the votes of the Cour t 
and Squad rone . A l though Queensbe r ry as queen ' s commiss ione r did not 
have a vote , he received £ 12,325 the bulk of the conver t fund ing - which 
he cer ta in ly deployed to pay spies and agent p rovoca teurs to e n h a n c e the 
au ra of m e n a c e s u r r o u n d i n g the last pa r l i amen ta ry session. In all proba-
bi l i ty , he also m a d e discre t ionary bu t unrecorded paymen t s to waver ing 
m e m b e r s of the Cour t and Squad rone (Aufrere 1817, pp . 262 72); Riley 
1969, p p . 408-527). 
Par t icu la r a t ten t ion has been given to the votes for each m e m b e r in the 
30 recorded vot ing divis ions on art icles, a m e n d m e n t s and procedura l dis-
pu tes be tween the first vo te on Un ion of 4 N o v e m b e r 1706 and that on its 
rat i f icat ion on 15 J anua ry 1707. As well as the total votes cast by each 
m e m b e r , t he division of votes for and against has been i temized and fur 
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t he r sorted in to cons t i tu t ional , economic and political divis ions to facili-
t a te ident i f icat ion of par ty consistency and cohesion as well as cross-party 
vo t ing . Such sor t ing, t hough admi t ted ly subjec t ive , is clearly suggested by 
the n a t u r e of the re levant art icles of U n i o n (Thomson 1824, pp . 307-414). 
Voting records reveal that only 10 m e m b e r s failed to vote in any divi-
sion, 2 of w h o m were present t h roughou t t he pa r l i amen ta ry session but 
were cons t ra ined by office from voting. Of the r e m a i n d e r only 2 had thei r 
absence excused. A l though 9 m e m b e r s abs ta ined in t he critical first vote 
on t he U n i o n and on its rat if icat ion, they did par t ic ipa te fitfully in in te r im 
vo t ing divis ions. T h e salient po in t about the vot ing record of the Scottish 
estates was the high degree of par t ic ipa t ion . T h e vast ma jo r i ty of m e m b e r s 
voted in over 20 divis ions. An elite band of 71 voted in over 27 divis ions. 
T h a t no par ty had an absolute major i ty in the house undoub ted ly served 
as a polit ical s t imu lan t to the high degree of vot ing par t ic ipa t ion . Even 
w h e r e the Cour t and Squad rone c o m b i n e consistent ly to effect the passage 
of U n i o n , they achieved an absolute ma jo r i ty on no m o r e than 6 occasions. 
Converse ly , t he confedera ted Oppos i t ion mus te red suppor t sufficient me-
rely to carry 1 a m e n d m e n t (sec Append ix 1). 
T h e combina t ion of vot ing and divis ional records not only provides a 
c o m p a r a t i v e indica tor to the par t ies ' p a r l i amen ta ry pe r fo rmance - notably , 
the i r capaci ty to ma in ta in par ty discipl ine t h rough consis tent vo t ing - but 
also reveals a relat ively high indulgence in occasional cross-voting; albeit 
no m o r e than 14 m e m b e r s (6 Cour t , 8 Oppos i t ion ) against the i r n o m i n a l 
par ty in at least 15 divisions. T h e Cour t and the Squadrone (103 and 27 
activists respectively) clearly ou tpe r founded the confedera ted Oppos i t ion 
by m a i n t a i n i n g higher par ty discipl ine, by secur ing a h igher p ropor t ion of 
m e m b e r s in the elite vot ing band and by indulging less in occasional 
cross-vot ing (see A p p e n d i x 2). No firm par ty t r ends can yet be d rawn from 
occasional cross-voting with respect to cons t i tu t iona l , economic and poli-
tical d ivis ions . 
T h e combina t i on of vot ing and divisional records , together with the 
appl icat ion of doub le negat ive in ter rogat ion (5) to fields govern ing parti-
c ipa t ion in protes ts , officeholding, m e m b e r s h i p of pa r l i amen ta ry commit -
tees and receipt of a r rea rs , provides an innova to ry insight in to par ty co-
hesion not only be tween but wi thin the par t ies du r ing the passage of 
U n i o n . T h e Cour t would appear to have m a i n t a i n e d its par ty d o m i n a n c e as 
well as its close association with the S q u a d r o n e by spread ing a r o u n d the 
spoils of office r a the r than concen t ra t ing political r ewards on powerful 
nob l e s and relying on the i r ter r i tor ia l inf luence over sh i re and bu rgh com-
miss ioners (Ferguson 1964, pp . 89-110). T h e converse of double negat ive 
in te r roga t ion , by reveal ing a high level of appa ren t offer as dist inct from 
p romise of reward or par t ic ipa t ion on p a r l i a m e n t a r y c o m m i t t e e s suggests a 
level of pr inc ip led c o m m i t m e n t to U n i o n h i t h e r t o underp layed whe re not 
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misident i f ied by h i s to r ians (Rober t son 1987, pp . 203-25). Of the 39 mem-
be r s w h o voted consis tent ly a n d wi thou t any tangible i nducemen t in fa-
v o u r of U n i o n in m o r e t h a n twenty recorded divisions, no m o r e t h a n 24 
par t ic ipa ted in the counted-protes t against the b locking tactics of the Op-
pos i t ion . I t wou ld seem ra ther dismissive, therefore , to p r e s u m e tha t all 
such p r o p o n e n t s of U n i o n were merely lobby fodder or p l acemen . 
D e n i e d ready access to the spoils of office, the Opposi t ion had de-
m o n s t r a b l e difficulties in ho ld ing their confedera t ion together . Indeed, as 
t h e da tabase serves to demons t r a t e , t he s imple categorizat ion of o p p o n e n t s 
of an inco rpora t ing un ion as t he Oppos i t ion Party is not only inadequa te 
(Riley 1978, p p . 326-35), but mis leading with respect to the c o m p o n e n t 
s t r eng ths of the confedera ted Oppos i t ion in the last pa r l i amen ta ry session 
of t h e Scottish estates (Ferguson 1977, pp . 180-96). In a clear b reach of 
pa r ty disc ipl ine , 19 m e m b e r s identif iable as the Jacobi tes , w h o exhibi ted a 
h igh indu lgence in occasional cross-voting and l imited en thus iasm for par-
l i amen ta ry as dist inct from ex t ra -par l i amenta ry protest , did not vote 
against t h e rat if icat ion of U n i o n . T h e most pr incipled g roup ing in the 
Oppos i t ion was the r u m p of 15 m e m b e r s identif iable as the anti-aristo-
crat ic Cons t i tu t iona l Reformers w h o ma in ta ined a high pa r l i amen ta ry 
profi le by consis tent ly vot ing and pro tes t ing against U n i o n . T h e r ema in ing 
Oppos i t ion (56 activists) can be deemed the C o u n t r y m e n , all bu t 11 of 
w h o m indulged in cross vot ing as befi t t ing an aristocratically domina t ed 
g r o u p of f rus t ra ted p l acemen . Nonetheless , that 11 nobles should identify 
closely wi th the vot ing and protes t ing profile of t he Cons t i tu t ional refor-
m e r s again, serves to indica te that the C o u n t r y m e n - despi te banefully 
oppor tun i s t l eadersh ip were not entirely devoid of pr inc ip le . 
T h e u l t ima te mer i t of th is da tabase is, pe rhaps , its par t ia l rehabi l i ta t ion 
of p r inc ip le by ques t ion ing the extent to which all m e m b e r s of the Scottish 
estates were exposed or susceptible to political inf luence in favour of an 
inco rpo ra t ing u n i o n . Tha t the vot ing pa t t e rns for the Treaty of U n i o n 
highl ight the p r imacy of the polit ics of inf luence in early e ighteenth centu-
ry Britain is d e m o n s t r a b l e . Tha t pr incipled c o m m i t m e n t in the Scottish 
estates was a minor i ty activity is not contes ted. But, that such c o m m i t m e n t 
was the exclusive preserve of o p p o n e n t s of Un ion is insuppor tab le . The 
deba te con t inues . 
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Notes 
1. T h e pr inc ipa l sources for the cons t ruc t ion of th i s database k n o w n as 
T R U N V O T E are T h o m s o n 1824; Aufrere 1817; and Riley 1978, ap-
pendices . 
2 . T R U N V O T E database has been cons t ruc ted us ing DISHDATA as de-
vised in the DISH labora tory , Univers i ty of Glasgow. In ter rogat ion is 
by Q U E S T and the associated Q U T I L S and Q U A N A L are used for 
g raph ic quant i f ica t ion . 
3. P T h e Rest represen t s pe t i t ions from five b u r g h s submi t ted separately 
on 8,9 and 28 N o v e m b e r and 3 and 8 D e c e m b e r 1706. A N / A repres-
ents the non-appl icabi l i ty of pe t i t ions to t h e nobi l i ty w h o a t tended the 
estates as ind iv idua ls not as cons t i tuency representa t ives . Whi l e B NO 
signifies tha t 35% of the total m e m b e r s h i p did no t receive a pe t i t ion , 
th is f igure represen ts jus t over half of the 66% eligible to receive pe-
t i t ions from the i r cons t i tuencies . 
4. Of t he 31 m e m b e r s cited in all 30 recorded vo t ing divis ions, n o n e was 
affiliated to the Oppos i t ion . 
5. T h e s t r inging of negat ives to coun te rac t N / A - no t appl icable - va lues 
wi th in fields: a c u m b e r s o m e p rocedure for in te r roga t ion which serves 
to highest t he inflexibility of Q U E S T . 
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Appendix 1 
R E C O R D E D V O T I N G D I V I S I O N S 
60 
For / Agnt Maj 
(i) Constitutional 
FSTVOTE* Pr inc ip le 1 1 6 / 8 3 33Ü 
R A T I F Ratif icat ion 1 1 0 / 8 9 21 
S E C U R E L * Presbyter ian Estab . 113 / 38 75 
V O T E 2 * Succession 116 / 57 59Ü 
V O T E 3 * Pa r l i amen t 113 / 83 30 
VOTE21A Burgh Privi leges 104 / 22 82 
VOTE21B 105 / 08 97 
V O T E 2 3 Peers ' Privi leges 88 / 50 38 
(ii) Economic 
V O T E 4 Free Trade 154 / 19 135Ü 
VOTE7 Excise 1 1 4 / 7 8 36 
VOTE14A C u s t o m s Dut ies 107 / 88 19 
VOTE14B 105 / 66 39 
VOTE15A* Equiva len ts 121 / 50 71Ü 
VOTE15B 138 / 27 111Ü 
V O T E 8 A Salt Tax 92 / 93 (01) 
VOTES B M *» 1 1 0 / 8 2 28 
V O T E 8 C 114 / 39 75 
V O T E 8 D * »< 1 1 2 / 8 6 26 
V O T E 1 5 C Equiva len ts 112 / 71 41 
V O T E 1 5 D 1 1 2 / 5 5 57 
VOTE18A Regulat ion of Trade 103 / 72 31 
VOTE18B 103 / 52 51 
(iii) Political 
P R O C D I S P Voting Sequence 1 1 2 / 8 4 28 
P R O C L A M 1 Unlawful Meet ings 145 / 04 141Ü 
P R O C L A M 2 1 1 0 / 6 2 48 
V O T E 2 2 A Scottish Rep . 114 / 73 41 
VOTE22B 101 / 59 42 
V O T E 2 2 C 105 / 54 51 
V O T E 2 2 D 83 / 65 18 
V O T E 2 2 E 94 / 63 31 
(* - Preceded by protes t [s]) 
(ü - Abso lu te major i ty ) 
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Appendix 2 
Party Voting Profiles 
61 
C O U R T S Q U A D R O N E O P P O S I T I O N 
N O M I N A L 
S T R E N G T H 
*106 *27 •97 
N O N V O T I N G 5 0 5 
C R O S S E D F L O O R 6 0 8 
A C T U A L 
S T R E N G T H 
*103 *27 •90 
S O L I D P A R T Y 
L I N E 
66 *20 •38 
S O L I D P A R T Y 
20 + V O T E S 
60 *20 • 2 3 
S O L I D P A R T Y • 
E L I T E (27 + ) 
40 *16 5 
O C C A S I O N A L 
C R O S S V O T I N G 
29 7 •46 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 14 — 1989 — No. 3, 53-61
